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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1280 
 ___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
NATHANIEL MONTGOMERY 
a/k/a 
“SHU SHU” 
 
                    Nathaniel Montgomery, 
                      Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Criminal No. 2:02-cr-00172-020) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Stewart Dalzell 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 1, 2012 
 Before:  SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR. and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: June 11, 2012 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Nathaniel Montgomery appeals the denial of the motion he filed pursuant to 18 
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U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  We will affirm. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we will but briefly recite the facts of 
this case.  Montgomery was indicted on a drug-conspiracy charge stemming from his role 
in the notorious Carter Organization; specifically, he was charged with conspiracy to 
distribute more than five kilograms of powder cocaine and more than fifty grams of crack 
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  Following a jury trial, Montgomery was 
convicted of the offense.  The pre-sentence report (PSR) prepared by the probation office 
determined that Montgomery was “accountable for greater than 1.5 kilograms of cocaine 
base (“crack”); and greater than 150 kilograms of powder cocaine (which combine to 
equate to a minimum of 60,000 kilograms of marijuana) in furtherance of the criminal 
activity.”  PSR ¶ 63.  Applying the November 2003 Sentencing Guidelines, the PSR set 
Montgomery’s base offense level at 38.  See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2003).  Following a 
Booker1 remand, Montgomery was resentenced in 2006 to a term of 280 months of 
incarceration.  We affirmed his sentence on direct appeal.  See generally United States v. 
Montgomery
 Since that time, both the statutory terms and Guidelines ranges attached to crack 
offenses have been lowered, and Montgomery has endeavored to avail himself of the 
changes.  In the appeal from one of Montgomery’s previous, unsuccessful attempts to 
seek relief via § 3582(c)(2), we explained to him why he might encounter difficulty 
, No. 06-1569, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25258 (3d Cir. Oct. 26, 2007).   
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premising his motion on the changed crack sentencing ranges: “[t]he more than 150 
kilograms of powder cocaine for which he was responsible supports his base offense 
level, wholly apart from any changes to the Crack Cocaine Guidelines range.”  United 
States v. Montgomery
 Montgomery filed this § 3582(c)(2) motion pursuant to Guidelines Amendment 
750,
, 398 F. App’x 843, 845 (3d Cir. 2010).   
2
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  While the ultimate decision to 
reduce a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is committed to the discretion of the 
District Court, we exercise plenary review over the Court’s legal analysis.  
 arguing that he was eligible for a reduction in his sentence due to the further 
lowering of the crack Guidelines.  The District Court denied relief, reemphasizing that 
Montgomery’s powder cocaine range had not changed.  Montgomery appealed. 
United States 
v. Styer, 573 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Doe
 The District Court rightly concluded that Montgomery was not entitled to relief 
under § 3582(c)(2), which allows for a sentence reduction based on “a sentencing range 
, 564 F.3d 305, 307 n.2 
(3d Cir. 2009). 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
2 The amendment “re-promulgate[d] as permanent the temporary, emergency amendment 
(effective Nov. 1, 2010) that implemented the emergency directive in section 8 of the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111–220 (the ‘Act’).  The Act reduced the statutory 
penalties for cocaine base (‘crack cocaine’) offenses, eliminated the statutory mandatory 
minimum sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine, and contained directives to the 
Commission to review and amend the guidelines to account for specified aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances in certain drug cases.”  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. 
C Vol. 3, at 392 (2011), available at 
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that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”  The sentencing 
range for powder cocaine was left unaltered by the modifications to the crack Guidelines.  
Compare U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2011), with U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2003).  Thus, our 
observation from Montgomery’s prior appeal retains its full force: the cocaine exposure 
alone would suffice to place Montgomery at a base offense level of 38.  Recognizing this 
impediment, Montgomery argues that the amount of crack and powder cocaine with 
which he was associated in the PSR represented “extrapolated drug amounts”; and, thus, 
he maintains that the lowering of the Guidelines range attached to 1.5 kilograms of crack 
(compare U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3) (2011), with U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2003)) could 
conceivably lead to an independent reevaluation of his sentence.  But § 3582 authorizes 
“only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing 
proceeding.”  Dillon v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2691 (2010) 
(emphasis added).  The District Court is not authorized, via § 3582(c)(2), to conduct the 
inquiry Montgomery seeks in the absence of a lowered Guidelines range, and here there 
is no question that the applicable range was not lowered.3
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2011_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/Appendix_C_Vol_III.pdf
. 
  Therefore, relief was properly 
denied.  Because we find the language of § 3582(c)(2) sufficient to so conclude, we need 
3 Moreover, Montgomery’s bifurcation of his sentence into “crack” and “powder” 
components is undermined by the fact that he was convicted on a single count of 
conspiracy to distribute both drugs.  See Montgomery, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25258, at 
*3.  We find no record support for Montgomery’s contention that he was sentenced 
“only” for the crack portion of the conspiracy.  See, e.g., Apr. 30, 2004 Tr. 46:19–22 
(adopting the PSR, as amended, as the findings of the District Court during sentencing).     
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not address Montgomery’s claim that portions of the Guidelines are unconstitutional.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.    
